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IN THE

:.

SUPREME COURT
O:F THE

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN C. DAVIS, .Attorney at Law,
for himself and all other duly
licensed and active practicing attorneys and counselors at law, similarly situated, ''cithin the State of
Utah,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case
No. 7241

OGDEX CITY, UTAH, a Municipal
Corporation, and CLYDE M. WEBBER, Ogden City Recorder,
-

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ogden City, a municipal corporation, through . its
Board of Commissioners, on April 15th last adopted an
ordinance, herein complained of, which was published,
and by its terms became effective April_ 17th, 1948. The
ordinance pur,ports to levy a tax upon those practicing
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l~w in that. city, as well as upon many other occupations.
The plaintiff is an attorney at law, who has been duly
licensed to practice as such and who has complied with
all the prerequisites imposed by the laws of Utah upon
those who wish to practice that profession.
The action is brought both for himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, to obtain the peremptory writ of this Court restraining the City of Ogden
from enforcing its ordinance so far as the same has ap~
plic·ation to plaintiff and such other lawyers as are affected thereby. The alternative writ of this Court issued, service thereof has been accepted by the attorney
for Ogden City, and the matters are heard upon the
demurrer of the City, and its co-defendant, the City
Recorder.
The petition of Mr. Davis sets forth that Ogden
City has numerous courts, including a division of the
'United States District Court, there sitting, numerous
public offices to which lawyers must resort, numerous
businesses having dealings in many points without Ogden
City and Weber County, its location, and that many
lawyers without that City, as well as those maintaining
offices therein, are interested in the matter before the
Court.· lt recites that shortly prior to the filing of the
proceeding in this Court the City, through its police
department, served notices upon him and other lawyers,
requiring appearances and· payment of the tax imposed
by the ordinance within five days from date of that
service. The ordinance is contended to be invalid, as
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3
to members ·of the bar, upon several grounds which will
be developed in th~") orderly arrangement of this ·brief.

ARGUl\fENT
The authority of Ogden City, 'vhich is not a char..
tered City, to levy any occupation tax must be derived
from some express statutory enactment .of the Legislature. The Statutes of this. State which have application
to the questions here raised are Sections 15-8-39 and
15-8-80, Utah Code Annotated 1943. Of these, the first
is a grant of power to license, tax and regulate certain
specific occupations and businesses, the practice of the
learned professions being in no instance included. This
then has applie.ation solely as disclo~ing the limits of
the reg·ulatory po,ver of Cities, and as establishing that
Ogden City has no po,ver to regulate the practice of lavl.
Section 15-8-80, so far as here pertinent, confers
authority, so far as the Legislature has constitutional
power to do so, upon cities to ''raise revenue by levying
and collecting a license fee or tax on any business within
the limits of the city. and regulate the same by ordinance,'' such po,ver not being limited by any specific
enumeration of po,vers contained in any other portions
of Chapter 8 of Title 15, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
but 'vith the requirement that such taxes shall be uniform in respect to the class upon which they are imposed.
. The ordinance in question, so far as pertinent to
this proceeding, contains the following provisions:
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It makes it unlawful to engage in "business"
within the corporate limits of Ogden City with.· out first obtaining the business license provided
for in the ordinance, to violate any other provision of or to ·fail to comply with "all of the
appropriate 1provisions '' of the ordinance, and
makes any such failure a misdemeanor. (Section
''1).
Business, as defined by the ·ordinance, includes all activities engaged in or caused to be
engaged in for gain or ·economic profit, ·except
the service of employees to employers, and is
further defined as including both the sale of
·tangible property, and ''the rendering of personal
services for others fo'r a consideration by any
·persons engaged in any profession, trade, craft,
business, occupation or other calling.'' (Section
20, (a) and (b).) .
Th·e City Commissioners are given authority
to revoke any license granted under the orrdinance for violation of any of its provisions by
the licensee, ''and for such other eause a.s is
justified in law','. There is nothing further in
the ordinance which -throws any ·1ight on the
quoted language. (Section 17).
.
The .ordinance bases the license fee Ujpon
a sliding· scale, graduated in accordance with
' 'gross receipts'' which are defined as covering
all receipts from any business subject to the
ordinance transacted in the ·city, except certain
excluded items .such as sales tax collected, receipts from sales or services rendered the United
.States, and certain federal taxes collected in conne,~t~pn with sales. (Sections 6, 10 and 19 (c)).
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Provi8ions looking to,vards enforcement include the requirement that the license .be eon~
spieuously displayed at all places of busines~
licensed, (Section 12), the requirement of keeping of books and records accurately reflecting
gross income and preserving same for four years
(Section 14), penalties of 10% plus·1% per month
interest on delinquencies (Section 15), ,p:r;ohib~t:ing false returns, (Section 16), power conferred
upon the City Recorder where ~pplication is not
filed and fee paid to determine amount of fees
due, plus penalties and interest, and to enable
him to so determine the amount due he is given
access to books, records, inventories, invoices
and stocks of goods of the licensee, put he may
fix the sum arbitrarily, since he is not required
to exercise such power of search, (Section 18).
Finally in addition to the criminal remedy
of prosecution, the right to bring civil suit to re·cover any sums due is extended, (Sections 1 and
19).

STATEMENT OF GRO,UNDS OF C·OMPLAINT
The ordinance in question is attacked by the petition upon the grounds that ;No. 1: The ;practice of the law is not a business
within the scope of Sections 15-8-39 or 15-8-80; Utah
Code Annotated 1943; and
No. 2: That lawyers, as a class, being licens:ed arid
regulated by the State, are not subJect to "license_ ·and
regulation'' hy municipalities; and
· · ·
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No. 3: That the ordinance is discriminatory in
that it taxes gross earnings (with some deductions which
it sets out) of those engaged in a profession or calling
and employed by the public generally, without taxing
others, including those of the same profession or calling,
who receive their remuneration from one or more persons in the form of salary, rather than of fees; and
No. 4 : That the ordinance, being in the nature of
one imposing a gross income tax, is in excess of thr
powers delegated to municipalities; and
No. 5: That lawyers, as a. class, being a part of
the judicial branch of the government, are not subject
to either licensing or regulation by municipalities; and
No. 6: That the ordinance impairs the rights of
litigants to be represented by legal counsel of their own
choice.

PROPOSITION NO. 1
The question is presented, does any 8tatute authorize imposition by ·a municipality of either a license or
an occupation tax upon members of the Bar~
There is no contrarity of opinion on the question
of the right of legislatures to grant to municipalities
the right to regulate the practice of the learned professions. It is held generally that regulation is the outgrowth of the police power, that it lies in the field :where
public health, safety or morals justifies interference
by the public by way of regulation of business to prevent
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damage to either, and the practice of la'v is not such a
business. rrhat the Courts, and in the absence of their
a8sumption of control oYer the field, the Legislature,
may adopt or pass regulatory rules or laws for the
Government of the Bar. admission thereto and ejectment therefrom, as a condition of :permitting its practice,
is conceded~ but this does not bring the practice of law
\Vithin the scope of the poliee power. That regulation
sounds fundamentally, as we shall see later, in the power
of Courts oYer those \vho are its officers and in the
imposition of conditions for such discipline upon those
to whom the restricted privilege of the practice of law
is granted. We submit that the books are entirely without example of any case where the regulation of legal
practice by any legislative body, other than a State
Legislature, can be found. For examples of cases which
discuss the necessity of the police ~ower existing to sustain regulation of businesses by municipalities, see:
City of Sonora vs. Curtin, (Cal.) 70 Pac. 674.
Hill et al vs. City of Eureka (Cal.) 94 ·Pac.
2nd 1025.
In re Quong Woo, 13 Fed. 229.

It is said in the case of the City of Sonora vs. Curtin (supra) on pages 675 and 676, where the question of
the power of the City to regulate the bar was directly
involved:
''There is nothing about the practice of the
profession of the law which makes the business
dangerous to the public. It does not threaten
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the public health or safety, nor is it demoralizing
to the public. - This ordinance could not have
been passed under the power to regulate, for it
is evident that the board of trustees have no
power to regulate the practice of the law. They
have no :power to pass upon or inquire into the
qualifications or character of persons who desire
to practice la,v, nor to say where or in what
courts they shall practice. ''
As we have pointed out, Section 15-8-39, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, giving power to "license, tax and regulate'' certain specified occupations does not include the
learned professions and, we may add, none o£ the many
sections granting powers over other businesses and occupations, which may be found in Title 15, Chapter 8
of the Code of Utah make any reference to the profe8sions. If that ~power exists, it must be found under Section 15-8-80 of said Code. 'Ve contend that it does not
there exist for two reasons :
(A). The legislative history of the act discloses
intent of the legislature not to place the practice of
the law within the scope of occupation taxes;
(B). The wording of the statute itself does not
extend to authorize the levying of occupation taxes upon
businesses within the regulatory power .
.As to (.A)-We think this Court has deter1nined the
right' of taxation of members of the Bar many years ago
and the legislative situation which it then outlined has
not been altered since the opinion in that case was
handed down. The case we refer to is Ogden City v~.
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Bore1nan, 20 Utah 98, 57 Pac. 843. In that case, Ogden
City sought to tax by the licensing method those en ..
gaged in professions in that City, including the defendant, \Vho 'Yas a lawyer. · The decision was against the
City and \\'"a~ based upon t'vo grounds, being:
(1) That. a general statute, similar to Section

15-8-80, as it stood prior to the amendment by
the 1935 Legislature, did not extend the power of
the City to license, for revenue purposes as there
attempted, any business or occupation not enunlerated in some specific statute, such as Section
15-8-39.

( 2) That the legislative history of licensing
provisions disclose,d the intent of the Legislature
to withhold the power to license the legal pro.:.
fession from Utah municipalities.
VVe shall not argue here the first of the matters
decided in that case, since the 1935 Legislature added a
proviso to Section 15-8-80 which expressly states that
''no enumeration of po,vers'' contained els-ewhere in
the chapter defining the p,owers of cities ''shall be
deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of authority hereby conferred.'' But we do contend that the
other point upon which the Boreman case was decided
remains applicable to the ordinance in question, and
that the legislative history there cited still remains applicable to the matter no'v before this Court.
1

It will be remembered that, as s·et out in the Boreman decision, .Utah had an expres·s statute re-enacted
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in the compilation of the 1888 laws, authorizing cities
to impose license taxes upon lawyers. The same laws
contained statutes which, with little change, remain as .
Section 15-8-39 and as S.ection 15-8-80 (with the 1935
proviso eliminated) of our present Code. In 1898, when
the revised statutes for that year were enacted, the
express grant of authority to tax lawyers was re1pealed,
,the other statutes remaining. This Court said on pages
844 and 845, in said Boreman case (Pacific citation):

''A general rule for the construction of statutes is that where a part of an act has been re.rpealed, it must, though of no operative force, still
be taken in construing the rest. - By repealing
the clause providing for licensing and taxing
~awyers, and enacting the general clause referred to, leaving lawyers, and the professions
generally out of such re-enactment, impels the
conclusion that the legislature intended to deprive the cities of the power to impose a license
f~e or tax upon lawyers that they had formerly
possessed. ''
It is to be noted that the only change in the language of that part of Section 15-8-80, which precedes
the proviso, made since its original enactment, is the
dropping from it of the words ''any !private corporation or'' which, in the original text preceded the word
"business". The scope of that part of the statute has
been narrowed, if anything, rather than widened. The
proviso shows legislative intent to destroy the objection to license taxes made in the first arm of the Boreman decision, that is limitation of the general statute to
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matter~

covered by specific statute, but the argument
tnade in the second arn1 of the opinion remains valid.
For it 'vould s.een1 to be clearly the law that, in such a
legislatiYe situation, an implication of intent to include
the legal profession in the scope of the licensing power
"rill not be indulged in : - express language is neces . .
sary, and there is in this statute no such express grant
of power to overcome the effect of the law of this State
as it existed in 1935. In American Co. v. City of Lake ..
port, (Cal.) 32 Pac. 2nd 622 it is said on ,pa.ge 629.
·'But the in1position of a tax by inference or
implication, no matter how logical or reasonable
it may seem, is universally condemned by the
authorities \\ hich lay do\\rn the rule that the tax
must be based upon express statutory authority,
and that doubts will be resolved against the taxing po"rer. ''
7

See also:
Cache County vs. Jensen, 21 Utah 207; 61 Pac.
303.
Salt Lake City vs. Revene, 101 Utah 504; 124
Pac. 2nd 537.
Lent vs. City of Portland, (Ore.) 71 Pac. 645.
Barnard and Miller vs. Chicago, (Ill.) 147 N.E.
384; 38 A. L. R. 1533.
To cite more cases would he a work of supererogation. There is nothing in decided authority to the
contrary. ~rhe rule is fundamental.

As to (B), - Section 15-8-80, interpreted as prior
decisions of this Court require, applies only to such
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:bu~in~~s.es as are within the regulatory power and. as

.tp· wliich the taxing ordinance contains some effective
:~~~sU:r.e of. regW..ation. The practice of the law, being
.~ntir~ly without the scope of municipal regulation, is
."Qeyp~d the power of the City to tax.
•

•

•

•

I

· Our argument is based solely upon the decisions of
'this ·c~urt. We are aware that in such sister states as
·caiifornia and New Mexico, the latter applying Califo.rnia rules, decisions to the contrary appear. Nor have
we ·failed to -consider that in such cases as Salt Lake
.City vs. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 Pac. 523, 17
.L. R. A. (NS) 898, this Court has reached a result which
·is contrary to ·the contention here made.- but in such
cases the rpoint we raised has not been discussed. Section 15-8-80 contains as its component parts ·a power
granted, a means prescribed, a limit on its extent. The
power is to ''raise r·evenue- and regulate'' the means
prescribed, are ''by levying and collecting a license fee
or tax'' and the limitation is ''on any business within
the limits of the City.'' Section 511, Subd. 11, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1898, a predecessor statute to Sections 19-5-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, granted to
counties the power ''to license, for purposes of regulation and revenue, all and every kind of business, not prohibited by law, transacted and carried on in such
county,'' then adding words limiting the power to tax
shows, ·exhibitions, etc., to those carried on without incorporated cities. Here again we have a power granted,
a means prescribed and a limit on its ·extent. The !POWer
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granted again 18 to raiSP revenue and regulate, the
means prescribed is that of a license fee· or tax and
the limitation is to business •'carried on in said county''
except as noted 'vith respect to shows, exhibitions, ·etc.
Gramatically speaking, the two statutes, while, having
a somewhat different arrangement, express identica]
powers having substantially the same limitations and are
to be carried on by identical means. We submit that the
interpretation placed on the statute respecting counties
applies \Yith full force and effect to the statute here considered, respecting cities. For that reason th·e case of
Cache County vs. Jensen (supra) seems to us decisive
on that point. In that case Cache County under the
statute granting license powers to counties abovereferred to, passed an ordinance applicable to ''the
business of raising, grazing, herding, or pasturing of
sheep'' within that County, fixing license fees on a
graduated scale based upon the number of sheep owned
or in possession, making failure to obtain a license· to
be a misdemeanor, providing for an official person
whose duty it was to collect the tax, and providing for
prosecution of actions ·arising therefrom. The Court
said, among other things :
I

''So a right to license a business or

occup~ation

does not imply a right to exact a tax merely for
revenue, and \vhere the object is revenue, the
power to license must be conferred in ·unmistakable tefms. Cooley Const. Lim. 242". (Ibid, p.
305.)
''. . . A municipal corporation, as such, has
no inherent po,ver to grant licenses or exact
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license fees; it must derive all of its authority
in this regard from the state, and the power
must be taken by direct grant, and cannot be
taken by implication". (Ibid, p. 306)
And held that the pov.rers granted by the ordinance
referred to extended only to the raising revenue from
businesses which, under it, the County might regulate,
saying:
''If the legislature had intended to delegate
to such boards, through the medium of a license,
the power to raise revenue without reference to
regulation, it was within its power to do so in
unmistakable terms. Any doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the language must be resolved in
favor of the public. The power must be the result of a direct grant, and cannot be ilnplied.
Such a statute must be construed ·with much
strictness". (Ibid, p. 306).
The converse of the argument made in the case of
Cache County vs. J·ensen arose in the cas-e of Ogden
City vs. Leo, 54 Utah 55·6, 182 Pac. 530, 5 A. L. R. 960,
in which, under a statute authorizing cities to "lic-ense,
tax and regulate'' certain businesses, including eating
houses, it was contended that the powers granted did
not ·extend to regulation beyond that necessary to implement the levy of a occu;pation tax and so did not authorize the City to prohibit installation of ·booths in public
ea~ing and drinking places. This Court held that the
statute was not subject to such construction, full force
being required to he given to the word "regulate" so

used.
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Our contention then is that, construed as this Court
construed the statutes provided in the two cas·es last
above-cited, Seetion 15-8-80 confers a power to raise
revenue and regulate, and that where there may be no
regulation there may not be power to raise :revenue,
so that in effect the statute extends the ~express powers
of regulation by taxing for such purpose to ·business and
occupations ,,-ithin the City which may lie within the
purvie"T of the police powers, and which are not elsewhere expressly mentioned, and authorizes such taxation
to go beyond the limits which a regulation tax alone
would ~l'ermit, and to invade the field where taxation for
revenue lies.
The practice of law, as we have seen, does not lie
"Tjthin the regulatory field of cities, nor is it subject
to any such regulation, the State having pre-empted
by its legislation ·all rights of that ·character over that
profession. It therefore lies without the scope of Section 15-8-80. So construed, the statute is valid. Construed as permitting cities to raise 'revenue and regulate the practice of la"v by means of license fee:s or
taxes, the statute would be \vanting in constitution·ality,
because the right to license, as distinguished from the
right to tax, the carrying on of the practice of law,
without regard to the qualifications of those so taxed,
is beyond the power of the legislative arm. We might
add that, while California cases uniformly hold th-at statutes giving the power to raise revenue and regulat~e
arP to be read as if thP "and" was "and/or", in at
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least one case that Court, while adhering to the rule~
did so on grounds resembling that which justifies application of the rule of stare decisis - that is, that it was
settled law, although probably not good law. See Ex
Parte Nowak (Cal.) 195 Pac. 402.

PROPOSITION NO. 2
Under this heading there is raised the questi9n as
to whether the practice of la'v is subject to taxation for
revenue, without any attempt at regulation. In the case
of Ruckenbrod vs. ~Iullins, 102 Utah 548; 133 Pac. 2nd
325; 144 A. L. R. 839, this Court has pointed out that
the authorities are in conflict respecting this matter.
In Sub-section (A) under Propostion No. 1 of this brief
we have pointed out that Section 15-8-80, Utah Code
Annotated 1943 applies only to such businesses as are
\vithin the regulatory power and that the practice of
of law does not come within the scope of such municipal
regulation. \¥"e respectfully submit that the argument
under that point is applicable to Proposition No. 2.
PRO~POSITION

NO. 3

Under this heading \Ve argue that the said Ogden
City ordinances as dra\vll, whatever may be its statutory warrant, is invalid because it is discriminatory, not
only because it taxes gross earnings of those engaged
in the professions and other callings, excluding others
\vho are also earners of incomes, but that it discriminates among members of tl1e various branches of the
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professions and callings by taxing those who serve the
public as a ""hole but excluding those 'vhose service is
lnnited to those only 'vho pay their fixed and stated
salaries.

It 'vill be noted that the tax or license fee is based
upon income, not"rithstanding the city refers to income
as gross receipts, so that the classification fixed for
the purpose of taxing or licensing is based upon persons
"ith an income rather than upon the nature or kind of
business, trade or occupation engaged in. As further
evidence\ that the tax or license is based upon income
is n1ade apparent in Section 13, 'vhich follovvs the state.
and federal income tax la,vs, making the information required upon the return blanks exempt fron1 public inspection, etc.; Section 14, which requires the keeping of
books and records for a period of four years ; and Section 18, which again follows the state and federal enactments, permitting the city to determine the amount of
income of one \Vho fails or neglects to file his return
and fix the tax or license due thereon ; also gives the
city the right ·to examine books and records of the subject to determine the correctness of his report and return.
After having classified the persons subject to the
payment of the tax or license fee, based up,on income,
the ordinance makes certain exce:ptions therefrom. The
general classification fixed is found in Section 20, as
follows:
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''A.. Business as used in this ordinance
shall include all activities ·engaged in ·or cau~ed
to be engaged in with the object of gain or economic profit,"
which classification, of -course, to that point includes all
persons with ·an income from any source whatsoever.
Having made the general classification upon which the
ta~ or license is based, the city ·seeks to make an exception therefrom as follows :
''but shall not include the acts of employees
rendering service to employers.''
In Sub-division B of the same section the act further
defines ~the words ''engaging in business'' and therein
includes ''the rendering of personal services for others
for a consideration by persons engaged in any profession, trade, craft, business, occupation or other calling."
(Italics added.)
The ·act must be considered from the standpoint of
the inclusion of persons employed for' a consideration
in any !Prof.e.ssion, trade, craft, business., occupation or
other calling as against the exclusion of ''the acts of
employees rendering service to employers'' and as
against th·e general inclusion of all income earners as
against the exclusion of ''the ~cts of employees rendering service to employers.'' We shall not make the contention that the city or the taxing power may not classify certain of its inhabitants UJpon which a tax or
license fee may be impos-ed and that it may not exclude
other groups from the payment of that tax or license
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fe·e. The contention is that the segregation or clas··
sification of different groups or segments of the population for taxing' or license must not be arbitrary
but must be based up.on reason to satisfy the provisions
of the federal constitution, which provides. that
""No state shall make or enforce any law
\Vhich shall abridge the I>Tivileges Or immunities
of citizens of the United States . . . nor deny to
any per~on within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.''
Alnendment XIV, Sec. 1, Constitution of
United States.
Article 1, Sec. 24, Constitution of lJtah.
That the provisions of the federal and state constitutions are equally ap:pJicable to the legislative enactments of cities as well as the state is so elementary that
we think the citation of authorities is not necessary.
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the inclusion of all income earning groups except ''employees
rendering service to employers'' in Section A of Section
20 is arbitrary and discriminatory against and abridges
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States residing within Ogden who are subject to the tax
and denies unto them the equal protection of the laws.
The exclusions or exceptions from the provisions of the
act, of wage earners are, using the language of the act,
''the acts of employees rendering service to employers''
to be a valid exclusion or exception, as previously stated,
tnust be based upon reason and must not be arbitrary
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or discriminatory. What, if any, could the reason be'
It could not be based upon amount of income, because
it goes without saying that the fellow who runs a bootblack shop and numerous other small businesses may
very well have a substantially les~s income than many
employees, particularly school teachers and executives
of- corporations, who in many instances are among the
highest income groups. It cannot be based on the necessity to regulate for the reason that many persons, and
particularly the professional groups, are not subjects
of any special or extra regulation by the municipal
government, to which wage earners ;and salaried groups
are not also subject. As a matter of fact, the storekeeper, such as the clothier, the furniture dealer, the
groceryman, the lawyer, the doctor or dentist, are all
engaged in legitimate business beneficial to the public
and community generally. All !professional groups are
regulated by the state through the Department of Registration and state courts, whereas the employee of the
employer who is running a gambling game or illicitly
selling liquor or drugs or a booking agent for a gambling house and many others who are engaged in immoral and illegal practices and subjects of the need for
great regulation and of great cause for concern to the
municipality and the public generally, are completely
exempt from the provisions of the act. It cannot be on
grounds of protection for the reason that the schoolteacher, who is exempt in the act, has the protection
of the school building and classroom in which he
teaches. The tools of his prof.e,ssion or trade are pro-
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vided for him. He has police, fire .and health rp·rotection
the same as the lawyer, the doctor or the storekeeper.
Hence, the only basis upon which the classification could
have been made is based upon the fact that the wage
earner or salaried person constitutes the majority of
our residents and hence casts more votes on ·election day.
It might also be noted that the doctor, the lawyer,
the dentist and other so-called professional men actually
earn their income through performing services for
others. They are employees in a sense as is. the manager, the janitor or other employee of a business. The
professional man is a specialist in his line. Most employees are specialists in their line. A salesman is hired
because he is adept and trained in the selling of goods.
He is a specialist in the same sense that the doctor or
lawyer or dentist would be a s:pecialist. The average
employee receives the same protection as. does the
average doctor, lawyer or other professional man in
that the place in which he is employe;d is protected; his
health and welfare are protected; his place of employment is protected by the police, fire, street and health
departments of the municipality. There is no true difference in the fundamental purpose of an occupation,
bet'\V. .een a man employed to sell automobiles and an attorney employed to protect the rights of an individual
in a court of law. The attorney has been and is held to
a greater degree of required proficiency by regulation
of the state. However, the fact that he is licensed by
the state and is required to adhere to certain rules and
regulations of the state does not change the fact in any
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\Vay that the attorney does receive his compensation
in the same manner ·as a salesman or any employee receives compensation and of course for the same purpose
"gain or profit". We find many lawyers who are employed on a salary basis by various companies and by
the 1nunicipal, state and federal governments. Such
salary V\ ould be exempt under the ordinance. \V e recognize the fact that these attorneys are given the same
protection. They have their offices in which to work
and perforn1 services for their employer, and these offices are oftimes not in a building owned or leased or
rented by the employer but are offices maintained by
the attorney. He is furnished the same protection as
are the attorneys ,,~ho are not regularly employed by
the corporations or governmental departments. There
is actually no difference betw~en an attorney who works
full-time for a corporation or a governmental agency
and one who "\vorks for a period of time for one corporation, then a period of time for another corporation or employer, be the employer a governmental
agency, corporate entity or an individual. Indeed, the
payment of retainer fees has always been considered
most desirable in the practice of law. The lawyer endeavors to be employed regularly by one or more employers. It is unreasonable and arbitrary to say that
because an attorney derives his income from a number
of ernployers that he is in a diff~rent class than the attorney who derives his income from one employer. The
ordinance in question sets up as a class all people receiving income. Assuming this to be a reasonable classi7
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fication, it certainly becomes unreasonable when fhe
large portion of the class as a whole are exempt and
excused from the payment of this license tax because
they obtain their income in a slightly different manner
than those "'"ho must pay the tax. We have already
pointed out that even their manner of earning their income is actually no different than the manner in which
the professional man obtains his income. We are all
em}lloyed to do a certain job. The professional man is
known as a professional man, principally because· he
is highly regulated and held to a high degree of }Jroficiency by the state. That State regulation and that
requirement of high proficiency resulting therefrom are
certainly no basis for discriminating against the profe-ssional man.
We can cite hundreds of ·cases, commentaries and
textbooks on the basic rule that, in order to tax a class,
the classification must be reasonable and not a mere
arbitrary distinction, in order that the above referred
to equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses
of the federal and state constitutions be complied with.
In State v. Wright and others, (Ore.) 100 Pac.
296, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated the following
on page 298:
''It is true a state may impose a tax on or
require a license from persons engaged in certain callings or trades without being bound to
include all persons or all property that may be
legitimately taxed for governmental purposes.
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able basis, and the law, when enacted, tnust apply
alike to all engaged in the business _or occupation. *** A statute which directly or by implication grants special privileges, or imposes special
burdens upon persons engaged in substantially
the same business under the same conditions,
cannot be sound, because it is class legislation
and an infringement of the equal rights guaranteed to all. ''
In the case above mentioned salesmen of certain
articles 'vere taxed, and salesmen of other articles were
exempt from the tax. None of the articles were injurious
or detrimental in any way. The class involved in that
case 'vas all salesmen. The class involved in the case
at bar, as set out by the ordinance, is all income earners.
The exemptions given in our case were arbitrary in
viev,r of the fact that there is no essential difference bet\veen the compensation earned by a so called employee
of employers and the compensation earned by an attorney, w·ho, is in essence employed by a number of employers.
The city ordinance has set out their classification
and have set out exemptions within this classification.
These exemptions are discriminatory and based on an
unsound conception of how attorney or other professional man obtains his income.
This Honorable Court in State v. Bayer, 34 Utah,
257; 97 Pac. 129, found that it was unreasonable to require a license for peddling of certain articles and exempting peddlers of other articles from any license tax.
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The court n1ade the following sta.te1nent on pages 131
and 132 of the 1pacific citation:
'• No"' it is apparent that under- the pretense
of exercising the police power or of adopting a
revenue measure, the legislature passed the act
for the 1nere benefit of local and domestic dealers. ****•** We are well satisfied that the act
has no such relation to the public health or morals
as will sustain it as a police measure. Nor can
it, because of its illegal discrimination as to property and :persons, be upheld as a revenue measure. We think it repugnant to the provisions of
the federal constitution that no state shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States nor to deny to persons within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the la,vs. ''
It is obvious that the ordinance in question in the
case at bar is not a police measure. Therefore, if it is
to be upheld as meeting the requirements of the federal
constitution, it must be upheld as a revenue measure.
A case in voint is State v. Parr, reported in 109
~linn. 147, 123 N. W. 408, 134 Am. St. Rep., 759. In that
case a legislative enactment sought to tax the occupation of and to license hawkers, peddlers and transient
merchants and then defined the occupations and distinguished bet,veen so-called transient merchants and socalled permanent merchants. The Supreme Court of
~{innesota, looking through the different groups referred to as hawkers, peddlers and· transient nler•
chants, made this significant statement on page 410
of N. W.:
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''The basis of classification is residence within a prescribed division of the state, the immediate effect of which is to protect such resident
merchants from ·competition from the outside or
to deny them the privilege of entering more promising territory than their own and adjacent
counties. ' '
Since the basis of the classification in that case was
residence within the prescribed division in the state the
court found that there was a discrimination between
members or groups of that general classification, and
that the measure violated
the state and federal constitu..
-tion both as a regulatory measure and as a revenue producing measure. The court further said in part on said
page 410:
''The legislature is not required to provide
for the taxation of occupations; but if such a
course is pursued and any occupation is selected
for that pu!"ipose, then the burden must fall
equally upon the members of the class.'' (Italics
sUJpplied).
By classifying upon the basis of income earners instead
of occupation, the principle of discrimination remains
as effective, and the same result obtains. That principle
was succinctly stated by this court in State v. Wright,
supra, in the following language: (page 298)
''But the classification must be on some
reasonable basis; and the law, when enacted,
must apply alike to all engaged in the business
or occupation.''
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In Park City v. Daniels, 46 Utah 554, 149 Pac. 1094,
this eourt again laid do,vn the rule, page 1095 of pacific
reporter:
•'It is essential, however, to the constitutionality of such statutes that the tax apply equally
to all persons of a given class and is uniform
and equal. Citing Salt Lake City v. Utah Light,
etc. Co., 142 Pac. 1067. **** The discriminations
which are open to objection (lack of uniforn1ity)
are those where persons are engaged in the same
business are subject to different restrictions or
are held entitled to different privileges under
the same oondi tions. ''
The State v. Parr case, supra, applies the same rule
\vhere the basis of classification is broadened to include
area or locality. It certainly does not require any
stretching of the imagination to apply the same rule
to the broader classification of income earners.
In State v. J. B. and R. E. Walker, Inc., a very
recent case, reported in 116 Pac. (2), 766, this court,
speaking through Chief Justice McDonough, s-aid, on
page 769, Pac. :
''In :order to see: whether the excluded classes
or transactions are on a different basis than
those included, we must look at the purpose of
the act. The objects and purposes of the law
:p·resent the touchstone for determining proper
and improper classifications.''
Surely the .purpose of this act is revenue, and the subjects to whom the act applies are income earners, beSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cause non-income earners would produce no revenue,
and the exclusions or exemptions ·must be based upon
some valid constitutional reason other than voting power
or numbers. The group covered by the general classification here and every individual member of the group
receives his or her income for ·some tangible or intangi~le
consideration, whether a service or for sale of goods.
It is, therefore, our contention under the cases cited
that this ordinance is arbitrary and discriminatory for
the following reasons :
1. That certain segments of the general classification (income earners) ;are excluded or exempted without any valid reason therefor, because all members of
the general classification have the same police, fire arid
health protection.

2. That there is no legal difference or distinction
sufficient to form a legal basis for classification between the income earner who receives all his income
f-rom one source or many sources.
3. That there is a discrimination resulting under
the ordinance in the income of individual members of
the general classification, that is, income based u1pon a
fee basis or salary or wage basis.
4. A discrimination against local residents who
practice law as against those residing without the. city
but maintaining offices therein, which would arise if
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the ordinance be held to apply to residents only. We
:point out in other sections of this brief that we believe
the ordinance as dra\vn applies to all members of the
profession, without respect to residence or place where
an office is maintained, and there assign our reasons for
deeming such a tax improper.

PROPOSITION NO. 4
That the city is without p·ower to levy gross income
taxes upon its residents would seem almost to be ;accepted without argument. For that matter, we are unable to see that there exists any distinction between the
power to levy a tax based upon gross income, as here,
and one based upon the income remaining after such
exemptions, deductions, and personal credits as the law
levying the tax may grant. This ordinance itself makes
certain such allowances, and is not a tax on all gross
income, although it omits ~power to deduct from the income taxed most of the items of expense which come
from income earned before its productiveness as net
income can be measured.
The power to levy any occupation tax and, as noted,
only such a tax could under any reasoning be levied
upon the practice by a lawyer of his profession, must
find its basis in some statutory enactment. The legislature of the State of Utah, while providing a system for
state taxation of incomes, has never seen fit to grant
such a power to its municipalities.
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PROPOSITION NO. 5
Here we raise a question which seems to have been
absent in litigation concerning the imposition of occupa . .
tion taxes upon members of the Bar. Perhaps this question has not been considered because of the fact that
the integration of the State· Bar associations and the
final taking over by jthe Courts of the rule-making power
and the control of the officers of the Courts including
lawyers is of comparative recent development. Want
of po\ver of the legislative authority to interfere with
the Bar of the Sta·te, particularly where the State
through ·an organized Bar, subject to the jurisdiction
of the Courts only and acting under the authority of
those Courts, controls the profes'sion, has been well presented to this Court in a recent brief in the case of
Thatcher et al vs. Industrial Commission et al, now·
pending before this Court. Because that matter has
been argued and is in the bosom of this Court we shall
not be so presumptuous as to repeat at length the argument there n1ade, however, "re cite the authority, mort~
fully discussed in the brief in that case and summarize
the rules of the la'v therein sitated. The argument sounds
in the function of the individual la\\ryer as an officer
of the Court, as well as in the fact that, the judicial
branch of the Government having taken over jurisdiction over the profession of the practice of la \v, the legislative branch 1nay not impose conditions of any kind
upon the exercise of his functions by the lawyer. That
such practice is so intimately bound up with the judicial
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power that it may not be interfered· with. by other
branches of the Government is !pOinted out in:
In re Platz 42 Utah 439; 132 Pac. 390.
In re Unification of Montana Bar Association (l\Iont.) 87 Pac. 2nd 172.

In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Association (Neb.) 275 N. ,V. 265; 114
A. L. R. 151.
State ex rel Ralston vs. Turner (Neh.) 4 N.
W. 2nd 302; 144 A. L. R. 138.

In re Fletcher, 107 Fed. 2nd 666, Cert. den.
302 u. s. 664.
Meunier vs. Bernich (La.) 170 So. 567.
See Annotation 144 A. L. R. 150.
We direct attention to those cases which are based
on the rule that when the judicial authority has ·once
moved into the field of contr9l of the Bar, and occupied
it, the legislative activity in that field, although perhaps
paramount before, ceased to function. See in re Berkwitzk (Mass.) 80 N. E. 2nd 45.
We also direct ;attention to the fact that, while, as in
the case of In re Platz (supra), this Court recognized
legislative enactments in aid of this Court's jurisdiction over the Bar up to a recent date, when this Court
adopted its rules in 1937, in these rules this Court incorporated statutory provisions so that they might continue in effect and declared that it adopted these rules
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under i·ts inherent power to supervise the conduct of
members of this Bar.
Whatever might have been the position of this
Court prior to the integration of the Bar under its
supervision, the Courts and the Courts alone may now
say what must be done by a lawyer to enable him to a:ppear in any Court in 'this State wheresoever situated
and wheresoever he may reside or maintain :an office.
..c\.ny legislative infringement in that field, whether by
way of license or tax or regulation, has no warrant.

PROPOSITION NO. 6
Our Petition sorne,vhat ineptly states the point we
desire to reach under this division. Our point might
be stated m,ore aptly as follows : If such an ordinance
as the one in question, 'vhich taxes not the maintenance
of a place for transacting legal business but the performing of any legal business in a community, is lawful, then
the result will be damaging not only ~to the lawyer but
to the public, since it will inevitably result in restrictions upon the field in which a lawyer can afford to
practice and so deprive litigants of service by counsel
whom they would otherwise employ.
It is the contention of plaintiff that the language of
the ordinance makes the requiren1ent of obtaining an
Ogden license incumbent upon every member of the
legal ~profession who practices his profe·ssion in that
city, - and this without regard to the maintenance of
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an office therein. \V' e concede that there are elements
in thi~ ordinanee \V hich look the other \Yay, -- such as
the requiren1ent of Seetion 2 that lieenses must be procured for each place of ·business within the City, and
the Section following it, \vhich requires separate application for each place of business, and also the requirement of Section 12 in the placing· of the license on conspicuou8 display, ''in the place of business licensed.''
But the express language of the ordinance can not Lcvaried by such rules, which would be applicable either
to an ordinance \Yhose incidence is equally upon maintenance of a ;place or places of business 'vithin the City
and upon the transacting of business therein. The
broader scope of the ordinance is shown by the fact that
the act made unlawful by Section 1 is not the maintenance of a place of business \vithout a license but the
engaging in business without a license. Engaging in
business is defined in Section 19 (b) as specifically ineluding ''the rendering of personal services for others
for a consideration by persons engaged in any profession, trade, craft, business occupation or other calling.''
Such language includes the small contractor \vhose office is "under his hat" just as readily as it includes
large construction companies with acres of land for
storage of equipment. It includes the peddler or canvasser who sells intangible property by sample as well
as the de:partment store. A physician who practices his
e.alling in the hospitals and in the homes of his patients
may have no place of business "rhere he might display
his license but 'vould n.evertheless be engaging in his
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profession within the City. The lawyer who resides and
maintains his office without the corporate limits of
Ogden City, possibly in South Ogden or Roy, but
who necessarily enters the territory of Ogden City to
appear in the Federal Court or the Courts maintained
by the State, certainly practices law in Ogden City just
as definitely as do counsel for litigants in railroad cases
or counsel representing other large corporations or litigants who customarily employ legal counsel vvithout
respect to the re'Sidence of such legal 1practitioners.
If such an ordinance can be sustained, then in view
of the needs of Utah cities and towns for· additional
revenue, which need must be a part of the general
knowledge of public affairs which this Court may consider, it is no idle speculation to say that cities and
towns generally will enact similar ordinances. Under
such condition legal counsel from Ogden would be required to obtain license fr·om and pay fees to Salt Lake
City for the privilege of -appearing lawfully before this
C·ourt or the United States District Court sitting in
Salt Lake City and for the privilege of examining records
or conferring with State Departments or commissions
or for the privilege of per.forming the multitude of
other legal duties which representation of clients now
impose~s upon the legal1practitioner.
The lawyer's charges are not ordinarily based upon
a time schedule but are predicated upon such other factors as the importance of the matter at hand may dictate. and as the results or the time expended may warSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rant and a multiplicity of such ordinances would im-

pose upon the la"~yer the impracticable task of assigning to eaeh com1nunity 'vhere he engages in business
the correct proportion of the fee to be paid by that
client, - and this with no standards established by
,vhich he may so assign the results of his labors and
with the constant danger that he may be found to have
erred in his computations resulting in his license being
rescinded and his right to appear before the Courts in
thi~ or that community taken away.
Such results are not speculative nor irnprohable
but are the almost certain results of such taxation of a
profession which, because it necessarily may include
"'ide territorial scope, is ordinarily treated by th~ ~ourts
in such 'vise that by "professional courtesy" even members of the Bar from without the state are permitted to
appear before our Courts in isolated cases without complying with the rules requiring Utah license and Bar
membership as a condition of the practice of law.
Such powers of taxation, so exercised, might well
limit the activities of members of the legal 1profession
to the places of their residence. No matter how small
the tax per county seat, the burden of reports, of in-quisitorial visitations by the recorders forces, of bookkeeping and similar other extra legal activities imposed
by such an ordinance, would 1put into effect a law of
diminishing returns from extension of business area.
But, a point which perhaps might have been made
under our Proposition No. 1, we think the ordinance
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is invalid not only on reason but because, in its attempt to tax those who merely engage occasionally or
casually in the practice of law· in Ogden City, maintaining no regular place of business there, the City
Commission of Ogden has clearly overstepped any
right it might have under the pertinent legislative
enactment. It appears obvious to us that when the
legislature granted to cities the right to levy a license
fee or tax ''on any business within the limits of the
city" it certainly did not contemplate that the fugitive
appearances of lawyers from without the city who maintain no place of business within the City should be subject to such tax.
We know that occupation ·taxes have been sustained on so-called '' tran_sient'' busine'Ss·es, such as those
who peddle from door to door as well as those with
fixed places of abode such as auctioneers who conduct
sales for only short periods, but those so taxed have some
locus of busine·ss where they carry on their callings,
- a store of some sort or a wagon or other vehicle upon
the street. There is something to which the license may
be affixed, where it may be "kept on cons:picuous display,'' as this ordinance requires, if only the case or
box in which the peddler carries his ~samples. The lawyer
has no such place , of business when he comes to such
city. He may be there to read a record or to talk with a
witness or to speak before a court or to try a case
pending before the court. His equipment is in his head;
he is not there to sell~something but to serve some cause.
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It appears to us that these considerations are sufficient to condemn this ordinance as overreaching, through its a ttetupt to brand as taxable such .acts as
the la,vyer may perforn1 as a part of the general exercise of his profession in appearing before the Courts
or doing other tasks of an investigatory character in
counties or cities other than the location of his office.
Certainly the lawyer located at Murray who tries a
case in the only places where the Third Judicial District
Courts sit is not attempting to ''engage in business'' in
Salt Lake City. He merely performs a function incident
to his duties as an officer of the courts of justice which
had their inception in that place where his office is
located.
In a sense, this question is not new, for a multitude
of cases may be found dealing with transient business,
such as grazers who rent lands or use ·a public do1nain
for herding their flocks or the many forms ·of businesses
which men may do in places other than those of their
residence. But where such taxes are permitted to be
levied upon him who enters the place without intention
of permanency of business there is some badge of location, Home property brought to be used. Search of
the digests and texts has failed to indicate a case where
an occupation tax, levied upon the ''rendering of some
personal service for a consideration,'' not accompanied
\Vith local possession of property used in a business,
or with some location where the business might have a
locus given it, has been considered an object of taxation,
PXcept by Ogden City,
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Ogden City, if it may lawfully tax those maintaining law offices within its limits, otherwise does not
lose the right to do so merely because it does not seek
to reach pra~titioners of the law from other cities. See
Evers vs. Mayfield (Ky.) 85 S~ W. 697.
We respecfully submit to the Court that the Alternative Writ of Prohibition issued by the Court in this
matter should be made permanent.
Respectfully submitted,

DERRAH B. VAN DYKE,
STEWART P. DOBBS,
IRA A. HUGGINS,

LLEWELLYN 0. THOMAS,
.Attorneys for Plaintiff
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